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Note
Affirmative Action: The Constitutional Approach
to Ending Sex Disparities on Corporate Boards
Julia Glen*
Observers may compare obtaining a seat on an executive
board as the payoff for successfully climbing the corporate ladder. Reaching the top is the ultimate achievement; starting on
the bottom rung as a new hire and rising up to leadership roles
requires working hard for many years and overcoming numerous employment obstacles, all to earn a seat at the uppermost
table. This metaphor fails to consider the additional challenges
plaguing women who try to climb this corporate ladder. Women
in the United States compose nearly one-half of the workforce;
1
yet, they hold less than one-sixth of executive board positions.
A woman working to obtain corporate leadership positions faces
far more rungs on her corporate ladder than her male colleagues, in the form of fighting sex-based stereotypes, unequal
pay for the same work, and the fear of (or from) sexual harass2
ment. Perhaps some rungs are missing or broken, demonstrable by the lack mentorship opportunities for women by women
within companies. And although the ladder keeps going up* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2017. Thank you
to the strong women who raised me and encouraged me throughout this process. A special thank you to my mother, Lucinda C. Glen, my aunt, Connie
Sheehy, my grandmother, Linda Cordes, and my law school friends and coeditors, especially Alysha Bohanon and Mary Heath. I would also like to thank
the editorial board of the Minnesota Law Review, William Elliott, Vanessa
Colletti, Taylor Gess, and Stephen Maier for their work on this Note. Copyright © 2017 by Julia Glen.
1. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 2010, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, http://www
.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/qf-laborforce-10.htm [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE]. JUDITH WARNER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, THE WOMEN’S
LEADERSHIP GAP: WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2015).
2. See LAURA BATES, EVERYDAY SEXISM 223–36 (2014) (describing a
study that showed sexist jokes, repeated questions about women’s ability to do
work because of their sex, lower pay, and other forms of subtle sexism are
harmful to a woman’s success in the workplace over time and providing examples from women who experienced sexual harassment in the workplace).
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ward, the glass ceiling often halts a woman’s progress before
she can make it to the top rung, allowing her to see the top but
3
prohibiting her from reaching it.
Although reasons for this disparity may vary, statistics
show that women obtain fewer executive board positions than
men, even though there are just about as many women in the
4
labor force as there are men. Historically, Congress has taken
legislative steps to counteract this reality. Congress passed the
5
6
Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
7
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 —to name a few—in an
effort to eliminate discrimination and limit the obstacles for
underrepresented groups, like women, in the workplace.
But even with anti-discrimination legislation in place, the
number of women in leadership is not representative of the la8
bor force. According to the Department of Labor, women com9
pose forty-seven percent of the workforce in the United States.
The largest percentage of employed women fall into manage10
ment and professional occupations. Yet, in 2015, women held
only 16.5% of the top five executive board positions in businesses on the S&P 500, and fourteen percent of all executive board
11
positions.
3. See generally Julie C. Suk, Work-Family Conflict and the Pipeline to
Power: Lessons from European Gender Quotas, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797,
1797–98 (2012) (describing the lack of women in leadership positions as a
“leaky pipeline” because somewhere along the way, women are slipping
through the cracks of the pipeline to power).
4. See WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 1.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (requiring equal pay for equal work done by
men and women).
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
8. See WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 1. Chimamanda Ngozi
Adichie offers one potential explanation for this phenomenon: “If we see the
same thing over and over again, it becomes normal. If only boys are made
class monitor, then at some point we will all think, even if unconsciously, that
the class monitor has to be a boy. If we keep seeing only men as heads of corporations, it starts to seem ‘natural’ that only men should be heads of corporations.” CHIMAMANDA NGOZI ADICHIE, WE SHOULD ALL BE FEMINISTS 13
(2015).
9. See WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 1.
10. Id. (reporting that women represent “51.5 percent of all workers in the
high-paying management, professional, and related occupations,” including
66.1% of tax examiners, collectors, and revenue agents; 53.2% of financial
managers; and 72.5% of medical and health services managers, to name a
few).
11. Matt Egan, Still Missing: Female Business Leaders, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/03/24/investing/female-ceo
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Many nations are taking additional legislative measures to
reduce facially unexplainable gender disparities in their domestic corporations’ executive boards. Norway, France, and Germany, for example, have established quotas for equalizing gen12
der representation on corporate boards. The United Kingdom,
also recognizing the problem, enlisted the help of a private organization and created a voluntary program incentivizing com13
panies to diversify the gender representations on their boards.
The United States has taken no comparable steps in reducing the gender gap, although the problem has not gone unnoticed. On International Women’s Day, March 8, 2017, a bronze
statue of a young woman with her hands placed firmly on her
hips appeared on Wall Street, standing directly in front of the
14
famous Charging Bull statue. The statue, named Fearless
Girl, was created to put pressure on corporations to promote
and retain more women in leadership, specifically in their
15
boardrooms. The plaque at her feet reads, “Know the power of
16
women in leadership. SHE makes the difference.” This statue
recognizing the lack of female representation on corporate
boards was originally intended to stay on Wall Street only temporarily; however, after much public support, Fearless Girl and
the message she was intended to send to corporations remains
17
on display.
Although the Fearless Girl statute drew attention to the
issue, the problem remains. Catalyst, a nonprofit research firm
on women in business, releases an annual list of companies in
the United States with zero women on their corporate boards
(“The Zero List”), showcasing the underrepresentation of wom-pipeline-leadership. Some report that, in 2015, the ratio of women in corporate boards rose to seventeen percent in the United States. See, e.g., Alison
Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/
german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-boards.html?_r=1.
12. See Smale & Miller, supra note 11 (listing countries with established
gender quotas).
13. See 30 PERCENT CLUB, http://30percentclub.org (last visited Mar. 31,
2017).
14. Verena Dobnik, ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Stares Down Wall Street’s Iconic
Bull, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-03-08/-fearless-girl-statue-stares-down-wall-street-s-iconic-bull.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Maya Rhoden, The ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Is Staying on Wall Street,
FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/27/fearless-girl-statue
-wall-street.
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en in corporate board positions in American companies. Some
companies responded by adding qualified female members,
19
while others did not. A female vice president of a non-profit
company expressed her cautious relief that some companies
have added female directors to their boards by saying, “I do
think we can say it’s no longer acceptable to have zero women
on a board of directors . . . I just hope we don’t get stuck at one,
20
and that one becomes the new zero.” While other nations are
setting legal quotas requiring companies to have at least forty
percent representation of both sexes, companies in the United
States should be wary of becoming comfortable by simply elim21
inating the “inexorable zero.” The fear of one being the new
zero is not without merit; it is statistically observable in the
United States. If one woman already holds one of the top five
positions in an executive boardroom, the chances of another
woman being selected for the remaining four positions goes
22
down fifty-one percent.
Some American companies have joined the 30 Percent
Club, a branch of a program established in the United Kingdom
promoting female representation on corporate boards, and have

18. Kimberly Weisul, Globally, Women Gain Corporate Board Seats – but
Not in the US, FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/13/catalyst
-women-boards-countries-us; see also 2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men
Board Directors, CATALYST (2016), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2015
-catalyst-census-women-and-men-board-directors (providing the most recent
annual report).
19. Weisul, supra note 18 (showing that the year the “zero list” was released fifty corporations had zero women on their board, and that the following year eighteen remained).
20. Id.
21. United States v. City of N.Y., 713 F. Supp. 2d 300, 317 (2010) (“[T]he
100% sex-segregated workforce is highly suspicious and is sometimes alone
sufficient to support judgment for the plaintiff.” (citing Loyd v. Phillips Bros.
Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 524 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994))); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711
F.2d 647, 662 (5th Cir. 1983) (“To the noble theoretician predicting the collisions of weightless elephants on frictionless roller skates, zero may be just another integer, but to us it carries special significance in discerning . . . policies
and attitudes.”); see also Weisul, supra note 18.
22. See Cristian Dezso, The Hidden Quota for Women at the Top, MD.
ROBERT H. SMITH SCH. BUS. (May 11, 2015), http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/
news/ras-spring-2015/dezso (identifying a “quota effect” in businesses where
one woman was in the top tier, the likelihood of another woman being on the
board drops by about fifty percent); Rachel Feintzeig, One Is Enough: Why
There Aren’t More Women Executives, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://blogs
.wsj.com/atwork/2015/04/07/one-is-enough-why-there-arent-more-women
-executives (citing a study conducted by the University of Maryland School of
Business and the Columbia Business School).
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set voluntary goals that will eventually lead to thirty percent
23
representation of both sexes on their corporate boards. Although it is encouraging to see progress, glacial movements resulting from legislation created in the 1960s, like Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act, is not the change to which the United States
24
should aspire. In comparison to other nations’ sex representation on corporate boards, the United States is severely behind
and could see undesirable consequences unfold in the global
25
business market because of it.
Other countries’ approaches to solving gender disparities
on corporate boards may be to institute a quota, but the United
States would not have to create parallel quota legislation to
achieve a similar end. In fact, it could not: quotas are unconsti26
tutional in the United States. Rather, the United States could
implement an affirmative action program. Affirmative action,
unlike a quota, is a constitutional approach used to right historical wrongs and end discriminatory practices, whether they
27
are facially discriminatory or discriminatory in effect. Instituting an affirmative action program narrowly tailored to eliminate the gender disparity in corporate leadership would be a
constitutional approach the United States could take to catch
up to the international movement of gender equality in business.

23. See Smale & Miller, supra note 11; 30 PERCENT CLUB, supra note 13.
24. This Note is not suggesting that Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, or other
legislation promoting equality between the sexes in the 1960s was or is bad
legislation. Rather, it is examining the progress made on representation of the
sexes on corporate boards since their implementation and noting how corporate executive board composition does not show a representative make up.
25. In a global market, consumers have more choices on where to buy and
why to buy from certain corporations and not others. Statistics show that people are willing to move their business and pay more for socially responsible
products. See Mike Hower, 50% of Global Consumers Willing To Pay More for
Socially Responsible Products, SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Aug. 12, 2013), http://
www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/behavior_change/50-global
-consumers-willing-pay-more-socially-responsible-products (“[W]here skepticism toward corporate social responsibility runs high, cause-marketers face an
uphill battle . . . . [S]ocial impact programs must be incontestably authentic to
a company’s business objectives, vision and values.”).
26. See infra note 82.
27. See Yena Lee, Reaction to: Reforming Diversity: Finding Our Way to a
More Inclusive Affirmative Action Jurisprudence: Should Historical Mistreatment Be the Basis for the Affirmative Action?, 5 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL
RACE PERSP. 79, 79 (2013) (“[T]he original purpose of affirmative action was to
provide redress to [historically-disadvantaged groups].”).
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Focusing an affirmative action program at the highest
echelons of corporate governance, the board of directors, is the
best place to start. Among other duties, a company’s board of
directors appoints the company’s highest executives. In a study
examining the female/male make up in S&P 1500 companies
over twelve years, David Matsa and Amalia Miller discovered
that once both sexes are represented on a company’s board of
directors, the number of women in the top executive positions
and higher managerial roles increase exponentially in compari28
son to companies with no female representation. The research
showed a ten percent increase in female representation on corporate boards over twelve years lead to a twenty-one percent
increase in female representation in executive positions
29
throughout S&P 1500 companies.
This Note aims to recognize the lack of female representation on United States corporate executive boards, and, using international quotas as an influence, promotes the establishment
of an affirmative action program to help combat this inequality.
Part I examines the doctrinal and theoretical basis of gender
quotas internationally, how and why these quotas would not be
allowed in the United States, and describes the roles of affirmative action and Title VII in the United States. Part II looks into
the benefits of a diverse corporate board and examines statistics surrounding gender representation in the United States.
Part III offers a potential two-step solution to combat gender
inequality in boardrooms. First, the United States should introduce a voluntary program similar to voluntary programs al30
ready established in the United Kingdom. The voluntary affirmative action programs would be consistently and publically
announced and celebrated to promote socially responsible business practices combating inequality. Second, Congress should
announce a voluntary program with incentives if individually
set affirmative action targets are met. Within this program, if
companies reached their individually set targets they would be
rewarded with tax breaks proportionate to their success and
the amount typically owed, as determined reasonable by Congress.
28. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in Corporate Leadership 2–6 (RAND Labor & Population Working Paper Series, WR-842, 2011), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/RAND_WR842.pdf.
29. Id.
30. See generally 30 PERCENT CLUB, supra note 13.
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF DOMESTICALLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL QUOTAS AND THE ROLE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Internationally, countries have utilized quotas to combat
the disparities in gender representation on corporate executive
boards. While facial quotas are unconstitutional under United
31
States jurisprudence, there are other alternatives available to
address misrepresentation and discrimination. This Part first
describes international programs instituting gender quotas, the
successes these international programs have seen, and the
measures other countries have taken to make quotas legal. It
then details the history of unconstitutional quotas in the United States. Next, it describes how affirmative action, a constitutional alternative to quotas, has battled inequality and the
standards that must be met to ensure the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs. Finally, this Part provides the
alarming statistics of female representation in the United
States.
A. INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON SEX EQUALITY THROUGH QUOTAS
Statistically, the United States falls well behind many European nations regarding female representation on corporate
32
boards. Many nations, excluding the United States, have taken legislative measures to combat the gender disparity in corporate board rooms by instituting quotas and amending governing documents the ensure the legality of the initiatives
33
promoting equality. Norway is one of the European frontrun-

31. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
32. Weisul, supra note 18 (showing the United States is ranked tenth out
of the twenty countries surveyed and how other nations with similar percentages have shown faster growth than the United States).
33. See Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences: A Transnational Reevaluation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 228,
237–48 (Debora Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) (providing and examining examples of French and Brazilian programs and constitutional amendments for corporate gender quotas); Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for
Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom Quotas as a Tool for Progress in the
United States and Canada, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. BUS. AMBASSADOR 81A (2012)
(showcasing the debates and creation of gender quotas in Norway); Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender Affirmative Action
in the European Union, Germany, Canada and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 27 (2003) (discussing the constitutional
amendments made to allow for gender quotas in government representation
and on corporate boards in Germany and efforts by the European Union).
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ners in bringing sex parity to executive boards. Norway is not
alone; France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have taken
measures to promote fair representation of the sexes on corpo35
rate boards. This Section examines the programs and legislation established in Norway, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, observing how each nation created their quotas and
noting the differences in the requirements of the quotas.
Many nations, when making the first steps toward equality
among the sexes, passed legislation requiring equal representa36
tion in public governing bodies. After amending constitutions
and public official representation began to become slightly
more sex equal, these nations took legal steps to promote the
same change in the private, business sector.
This Section describes the abundantly successful quota
system established in Norway. Then, it explains the quota creation process in France. Next, it describes the recently enacted
quota in Germany. Lastly, this Section describes the voluntary
goal program developed by an organization in the United Kingdom.
34. See, e.g., Jens Dammann, Place Aux Dames: The Ideological Divide
Between U.S. and European Gender Discrimination Laws, 45 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 25, 72 n.287 (2012) (stating Scandinavian countries are “held up as a
model for actively seeking to end all forms of gender discrimination” (citing
Jamie Alan Aycock, Contracting out of the Culture Wars: How the Law Should
Enforce and Communities of Faith Should Encourage More Enduring Marital
Commitments, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 235 (2006))).
35. See generally Totten, supra note 33 (examining arguments against
gender quotas in Europe and how European courts handled them before and
after the establishment of quotas).
36. Parity legislation is possibly the most logical first step towards equality, but one that is highly unlikely in the United States and is beyond the purview of this Note. The democratic election process is one deeply rooted in
United States history; and, while other nations have seen great success in
eliminating the gender gap in elected officials by instituting parity legislation,
legislation will likely receive harsher backlash than steps towards gender
equality in corporate boardrooms. Corporate boardrooms are privately run and
their composition is not publically voted on. See generally Fredrik Engelstad &
Mari Teigen, Firms, Boards, and Gender Quotas: Comparative Perspectives, 29
COMP. SOC. RES. 126, 126–30 (2012) (describing the evolution of legislation
globally promoting gender equality); Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr,
More Than a Woman: Insights into Corporate Governance After the French Sex
Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889 (2015) (explaining gender parity legislation in
France, the outcomes on decisionmaking post-parity legislation, and interviewing French political leaders about gender parity legislation); Ruth RubioMarín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and Why It
Won’t Fly in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 108–10 (2012) (providing
constitutional considerations made in Spain, Italy, and France when creating
gender quotas for political office).
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1. Norway
37

Originally, in 2002, the gender quota on corporate boards
in Norway was limited to companies on the Oslo stock ex38
change, or public limited companies. Since its implementa39
tion, in 2006 it expanded to include additional companies. The
implementation of legal gender quotas on corporate boards was
40
consequential to the Gender Equality Act passed years before.
If Norwegian companies failed to comply with legislative
gender quotas by 2008, the Norwegian government had sanc41
tions in place to use as punishment. First, companies received
a warning, followed by a fine, and if companies still failed to
42
comply, they would suffer forced dissolution. If need be, Norway has a system in place to allow state intervention in the
private sector to help combat the gender disparities globally
43
recognized on corporate boards. By 2005, women held twenty44
four percent of board seats. The forty percent goal was met in
37. Norway, along with the other nations used as international examples
in this Note, created gender quotas. This Note proposes an affirmative action
program on the basis of sex. Sex is the biological difference between male and
female genitalia, while gender refers to the characteristics societally prescribed to a sex. To preserve accuracy, this Note will refer to international
gender quotas as such, but does not intend to equate sex with gender. This
Note chooses to focus on a sex-based affirmative action program because of the
language used in Title VII jurisprudence, not because the author thinks that
affirmative action programs in the future should be limited to sex-based classifications.
38. LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, CBE, WOMEN ON BOARDS 24 (UK, Feb.
2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/31480/11-745-women-on-boards.pdf (providing information composed
by the United Kingdom when discussing their options in promoting equal representation in corporate board rooms); Mari Teigen, Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards: On the Diffusion of a Distinct National Policy Reform, 29 COMP.
SOC. RES. 115, 122 (2012); Norway Gender Representation on Corporate
Boards, WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT (Nov. 2008), http://www.eu-norway.org/
news/gender_rep_boardrooms/#.VtSB2JMrL6Y (“There are approximately 500
public limited companies in Norway . . . [p]ublic limited companies normally
have a broader spread of shares and less personal involvement in the management.”).
39. Teigen, supra note 38.
40. Id.; see also Sweigart, supra note 33 (showcasing the debates and creation of gender quotas in Norway).
41. All Norwegian companies required to comply with quotas by 2008 did
so and no sanctions were enforced. Teigen, supra note 38, at 125 (explaining
how nothing beyond a warning has been used to enforce compliance).
42. Id. at 124–25 (describing the sanctions available in Norway if companies do not comply with quotas by the established deadlines).
43. Id. at 126.
44. WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 38, at 22.
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its entirety by 2009 without issuing a single sanction. The
Norwegian Director General of the Ministry of Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion stated the gender quota “[is] certainly
positive and serve[s] both economic goals as well as democracy
and fairness. Research has shown that diversity is good for
46
business’[s] bottom line.”
The successes of gender quotas on corporate boards in
Norway depend greatly on the cultural and societal views of
business and government regulation of business within the nation. Such views in Norway differ significantly from the general, societal view of business in the United States. Dating back
to the Lochner era in the United States, the business sphere is
47
separate from that of the governmental sphere. Norway is
48
known as a corporatist nation, meaning the state is more
powerful than businesses, and the owners of businesses are
considered to be the communities they serve rather than the
49
business leaders who run them. In contrast, the United States
is a pluralist nation, where the state does not participate in institutionalized negotiations with large businesses, but rather
business can influence political change by lobbying and through
50
other avenues of political speech. Additionally, contrary to the

45. Id. (“[F]ull compliance was achieved by 2009.”). But see Dammann,
supra note 34, at 73–74 (highlighting that the Norwegian quota only affected
the composition of supervisory boards, which by definition do not have any
managerial power: while women hold more leadership positions, the increase
in managerial power may not receive the same success).
46. Arni Hole, Government Action To Bring About Gender Balance, WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://womenonboards.gocirql.com/pubs/articles/norway.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017); see also Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449,
452 (2012).
47. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991) (defining the Lochner era
as a time when “judges concerned about protecting big business from the nascent regulatory state departed from the norm of restraint and substituted
their values . . . underconstru[ing] the scope of congressional power and overprotect[ing] private property”).
48. Suk, supra note 46, at 459 (describing corporatist regimes as nations
where “public policy is made not only through legislation adopted by representatives elected through universal suffrage, but also through negotiations
between the state and interest groups, such as industry associations and trade
unions”).
49. Vibeke Heidenreich, Why Gender Quotas in Company Boards in Norway—and Not in Sweden?, 29 COMP. SOC. RES. 147, 161 (2012).
50. See id. at 176 (describing how Sweden, like the United States, has a
different ideological view of the role of business and the government compared
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United States, Norway has a state-feminist tradition, strongly
51
emphasizing gender equality.
2. France
Following Norway, France recognized and addressed the
52
gender disparity on corporate boards. France, like many European nations, first instituted political parity legislation, making sure there was adequate representation of the sexes in pub53
lic office.
France did not approach their quota exactly like Norway
did, but after successfully instituting parity legislation in government, opted for constitutional amendments to ensure the le54
gality of gender quotas. In 2006, France tried to pass legislation similar to Norway’s quota legislation, but it was struck
55
down as unconstitutional. Consequentially, France amended
the constitution, eliminating this barrier the second time
around. The constitutional amendment “requir[ed] the law to
promote equal access by men and women to professional and
56
social responsibility.” This amendment allowed for the consti57
tutionality of corporate gender quotas. Before implementing
legislation for gender quotas on corporate boards, the French
58
instituted gender quotas for elected government bodies. The
to Norway); Suk, supra note 46, at 462 (describing the United States as a pluralist nation and explaining what that entails).
51. Teigen, supra note 38, at 125 (describing Norway’s gender equality
measures encouraging female employment by providing paid maternity and
paternity leave, on-site kindergartens, etc.).
52. Id. at 128.
53. Id. (describing the parity legislation in France, and providing statistics showing that in 2010 only nineteen percent of parliament members were
women).
54. See Dammann, supra note 34, at 46–52 (showcasing ideological differences of women in the workplace in France and the United States); Rosenblum
& Roithmayr, supra note 36, at 895–97 (exploring how French officials and citizens felt about the gender quotas); Suk, supra note 33, at 237–44 (providing
and examining examples of French and Brazilian programs and constitutional
amendments for corporate gender quotas).
55. Suk, supra note 46, at 451 (detailing France’s legislative process in
creating gender quotas).
56. Id. (citing Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République, art. 1, J.O., July 24, 2008, at
11890 (Fr.)).
57. Id. at 451, 457–58 (describing the path the French took to first make a
constitutional amendment to allow for gender quotas in elected, public office
and then gender quotas in private corporate business).
58. Id. at 457.
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French government used gender quotas in elected government
bodies as a stepping-stone to create the gender quota on corpo59
rate executive boards.
France requires at least forty percent representation of
60
each gender on public corporate boards. By creating checkpoint dates, France recognized the improbability of reaching
61
this percentage immediately passing the law. In 2013, France
required a minimum of twenty percent representation by either
gender, and set a forty percent representation goal to be
62
reached in 2016. While the French forty percent quota was not
63
yet met in 2015, tremendous progress was noted at the time.
3. Germany
Germany joined the sex equality on corporate boards
64
movement by establishing a quota in 2015. Prior to the passage of quotas, the top thirty companies in Germany already
surpassed the United States’ average female representation by
having twenty-five percent female composition on corporate
boards, prior to the passage of quotas, but fell short of the new
65
thirty percent requirement. Like Norway and France, Germany passed a constitutional amendment making the creation of
66
gender quotas legal.
Originally, some companies were required to set “flexi quotas” establishing targets for the number of women on corporate
67
boards. If these flexi-quotas were not met, there would be
68
fines to follow. Under the new law, nearly 100 corporations
were given a 2016 deadline to fill at least thirty percent of their
69
corporate executive boards with women. Companies falling
within the thirty percent quota requirement include Germany’s
largest companies with shareholders and employees composing
59. Id. at 457–58.
60. Teigen, supra note 38, at 128.
61. See id. at 123–24.
62. Id. at 128.
63. See Weisul, supra note 18 (showing by January 2015, 29.7% of corporate board seats in France were held by women).
64. See Smale & Miller, supra note 11.
65. Id.
66. Totten, supra note 33, at 39–44 (discussing the constitutional amendments made to allow for gender quotas in government representation and on
corporate boards in Germany and efforts by the European Union).
67. Teigen, supra note 38, at 131.
68. Id.
69. Smale & Miller, supra note 11.
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70

These companies, such as
their supervisory boards.
Volkswagen with only fifteen percent women on their executive
board, will have to fill the gender representation gaps or face
71
penalties. Adidas, a German company with the newly as72
signed quota, already met the thirty percent requirement.
Thousands of additional, smaller companies were required to
submit their official plans to integrate women into their corpo73
rate boards by the end of September 2015. By 2018, the plan
74
is to increase the quota to fifty percent gender representation.
Discussions surrounding a gender quota in Germany were
75
not always positive. For example, some German businesses
were worried they would not be able to find enough qualified
women to fill the roles in time to avoid penalties, that the cost
to comply will be unduly burdensome, and it will only result in
companies moving out of Germany to avoid making any chang76
es. Despite these concerns, similar programs in Norway have
not resulted in companies relocating to avoid the gender quo77
ta.
4. United Kingdom
Unlike any of the aforementioned nations, the United
Kingdom took a voluntary, less quota-like approach to fixing
the gender disparity on corporate boards. The Thirty Percent
Club is not a quota, but an initiative program promoting gen-

70. Alanna Petroff, Germany’s New 30% Rule for Women on Boards, CNN
MONEY (Mar. 8, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/06/news/women-boards
-germany-30.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Smale & Miller, supra note 11; see also Petroff, supra note 70.
74. Petroff, supra note 70.
75. Teigen, supra note 38, at 131; see also Heather Horn, What the World
Can Learn from Germany’s Debate over Gender Quotas, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-the
-world-can-learn-from-germanys-debate-over-gender-quotas/253664 (discussing the need for gender equality in Germany); Nicole Sagener, Germany Debates Bill To Set Gender Quota on Corporate Boards, EURACTIV.COM (Mar. 3,
2015), http://www.euractiv.com/section/all/news/germany-debates-bill-set
-gender-quota-on-corporate-boards (showing thoughts of those who voted for
and against the implementation of gender quotas on corporate boards in Germany and pointing out arguments both for and against a gender quota in
Germany).
76. Sagener, supra note 75.
77. See supra Part I.A.1.

2102

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2089

78

der balance through voluntary means. By publically publishing the composition of their corporate executive boards and
promoting their continued efforts to include women in leadership positions, companies who signed up to be a part of this
79
program are seen as socially and culturally conscious. The
Thirty Percent Club has seen tremendous results, increasing
female representation on corporate boards from 12.5% to just
80
over twenty-three percent since 2010.
Norway, France, and Germany amended their constitutions to affirm the legality of gender quotas on executive
81
boards. The United Kingdom has not instituted a quota, but
does have a prominent voluntary program promoting equal
gender representation on corporate board. Currently, there is
neither a prominent voluntary program, nor a governmentmandated quota or goal in the United States to promote equal
gender representation on corporate executive boards.
B. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUOTAS IN THE UNITED STATES
As the last Section described, other nations have had success with increasing female representation on corporate boards
through quotas. Some have even amended their constitutions to
allow for these quotas. This approach is unlikely to pass muster
in the United States, however, as the United States Supreme
Court has held that any type of quota is unconstitutional because it strips a person of their individuality provided by the

78. Teigen, supra note 38, at 132.
79. See 30 PERCENT CLUB, supra note 13.
80. Id.
81. Unlike the United States, Norway, France, and Germany amend their
respective governing documents more frequently. Compare Patrick Bahners,
What Distinguishes Germany’s Basic Law from the United States Constitution?, NOTRE DAME NEWS (May 18, 2009), http://news.nd.edu/news/human
-dignity-and-freedom-rights (“The American [C]onstitution has been changed
only twenty-seven times during the 222 years of its existence . . . .”) (translating FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, http://www.faz.net (May 18, 2009)),
with Grunnlovsjubileet, The Bicentenary of the Norwegian Constitution 2014,
http://www.stortinget.no/en/Grunnlovsjubileet/In-English/The
STORTINGET,
-Bicentenary-of-the-Norwegian-Constitution-2014 (last visited Mar. 31, 2017)
(“The Norwegian Constitution has been amended more than 400 times since
1814 . . . .”), and ELAINE MAK, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A GLOBALISED
WORLD: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF WESTERN
HIGHEST COURTS 22 (2013) (“The French Constitution of 1958 has been
amended . . . 24 times since its adoption . . .”), and Bahners, supra (stating at
that time the German governing documents had been changed fifty-five times
in their sixty-one years of existence).
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82

Constitution. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution provide such protections to the in83
dividual. In attempts to correct a history of discrimination,
84
carefully crafted affirmative action programs can be initiated.
These programs have the ability to promote a group of individuals over another, as long as the program fits within criteria
85
tailored through precedent.
This Section examines the unconstitutionality of quotas in
the United States by looking at the text and interpretation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, it introduces and explains the role Title VII plays in combating inequality in the United States and what the text of Title VII says
about quotas.
1. Quotas Violate Constitutional Requirements Established by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to all persons
86
“equal protection of the laws.” Any instance in which a person
is treated differently because of their membership in any protected group falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amend87
ment. Even if statutes or private actions fall under the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, this does not automatically mean those statutes or private actions violate the Four88
teenth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to
89
provide equal protection of the laws. The textual composition
82. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289, 299
(1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) (describing the individuality protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
309, 334 (2003) (reaffirming Bakke’s holding that quotas are unconstitutional,
violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2( j) (1964) (stating preferential treatment will not be granted because
of a percentage imbalance). See generally 136 CONG. REC. 31,827, 31,828
(1990) (detailing President George H.W. Bush’s veto of the Civil Rights Act of
1990 because it may have resulted in the ability to establish quotas on employers).
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (outlining the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as they apply to the workplace).
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
87. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 229–30 (1995)).
88. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of the Fifth Amendment lacks the same “equal protection” lan90
guage provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause evolved prior to parallel
91
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Before the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment to provide equal protection like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
was interpreted to allow for racially discriminatory legislation
92
that would not survive modern legal standards. Now, the
Fifth Amendment is read to require of the federal government
what is required of the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
2. Title VII’s Role in Protecting Individuals from
Discrimination and Reaffirming the Illegality of Quotas
Title VII of the United States Code prohibits discrimina93
tion based on sex, race, color, natural origin, or religion. A
product of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
94
privileges or employment.” One of the stated purposes for cre95
ating Title VII was to protect racial minorities but Title VII’s
96
protections are not limited to racial discrimination. Title VII

90. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
91. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 213–15; see, e.g., Detroit Bank
v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (citing LaBelle [sic] Iron Works v.
United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 584–85 (1937); Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400, 401
(1940); Helvering v. Lerner Stores Co., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941)) (holding the
Fifth Amendment does not protect individuals from discriminatory legislation
created by Congress, even though the Fourteenth Amendment provides such
protections from states).
92. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (holding Congress has the ability to condone and enforce racially discriminatory
legislation isolating Japanese Americans).
93. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
94. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
95. See Louis Menand, The Sex Amendment: How Women Got in on the
Civil Rights Act, NEW YORKER, July 21, 2014, at 80.
96. See id.
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protections extend to a vast array of underrepresented and
97
vulnerable groups.
Congress created Title VII “pursuant to the commerce
power to regulate purely private decisionmaking . . . . [It] was
not intended to incorporate and particularize the commands of
98
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” This shows that
Congress did not intend for Title VII just to apply to the state
and federal government, but rather to private actors, because
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments already require antidiscriminatory practices of the State. Legislative history “emphasize[s] . . . that Title VII would open up the upper echelons
99
of private enterprise” by prohibiting discriminatory practices
targeted toward a particular group of people in the private
sphere, but was not intended to eliminate the individuality pro100
tected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he prohibition against . . . discrimination . . . must . . . be read against the background of the
legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from
101
which the Act arose.” Title VII was intended as a “catalyst”
for employers to analyze their “practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate
102
and ignominious page in this country’s history.”
Title VII eliminates the possibility of establishing a quota.
The text states that no employer shall “limit, segregate, or classify his employees [or applicants for employment] in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee” based on the aforementioned list of character103
istics. Title VII dictates that nothing within Title VII itself
97. See Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49
J.S. HIST. 37, 37–56 (1983) (describing the jurisprudential evolution of Title
VII to protect against gender discrimination). See generally Francis J. Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 431–58 (1966)
(providing a detailed legislative history of Title VII, including the initial purpose of protecting racial minorities from discriminatory employment practices).
98. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979).
99. See Dammann, supra note 34, at 49.
100. See id. at 49 n.146 (discussing ramifications on individual choice while
still promoting equality).
101. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
102. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
103. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1964).
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should ever be interpreted to require employers or schools to
create preferential treatment to fix any percentage imbalance
104
of the aforementioned characteristics. Title VII states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons . . . in comparison with the total number of [sic] percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any
105
community, State, section, or other area . . . .

While the existence of Title VII §§ 703(a) and 703(j) may
close the door on the possibility of quotas, they do not prohibit
all forms of affirmative action programs. Title VII allows the
employment or classification of a person based on their sex,
race, color, natural origin, or religion if one of these characteristics is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
106
enterprise.” Title VII also protects employees from any sort of
107
adverse treatment because of traditional gender stereotypes.
Congress legalized affirmative action programs through Title
VII in hopes of spurring voluntary action and local resolution of
forms of discrimination by recognizing and aiding historically
108
disadvantaged groups. Thus, Title VII does not eliminate the
constitutionality of affirmative action: it is the legal basis for
affirmative action programs. The next Section will explore further the distinction between quotas and affirmative action programs.

104. See id. § 2000e-2( j).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
107. Suk, supra note 3, at 1799 (describing Title VII’s protections against
gender discrimination in the workplace); see also Thomas v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The concept of ‘stereotyping’ includes not
only simple beliefs such as ‘women are not aggressive’ but also . . . more subtle
cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and judgments.”); U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES
EEOC NOTICE 915.002 (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html
(“Employment decisions based on . . . stereotypes violate the federal antidiscrimination statutes, even when an employer acts upon such stereotypes unconsciously or reflexively.” (footnotes omitted)).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963).
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C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL TO ADDRESS
INEQUALITY
An affirmative action program is one way Title VII allows
an employer to combat inequality in the workplace. This Section introduces affirmative action jurisprudence in the United
States. Affirmative action allows preferential treatment to a
group of persons based on a common characteristic as long as
these programs survive the scrutiny standard assigned to that
109
This Section examines what it
particular characteristic.
means to be a member of a suspect class protected by affirmative action and why gender fits within the requirements of a
110
protected class. First, this Section details the history of affirmative action in the United States, explaining jurisprudence
surrounding racial affirmative action programs. Then, this Section compares racial affirmative action jurisprudence to sexbased affirmative action jurisprudence to show that sex-based
affirmative action programs are easier to implement in a constitutional manner than race-based affirmative action programs because they are examined with a lower scrutiny level.
1. History of Affirmative Action in the United States
Quotas are unconstitutional in the United States, but nonquota affirmative action programs surviving the judicial scrutiny level assigned to the protected class are not. The Supreme
Court created the scrutiny levels appropriate for race and sexbased programs through their decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and its progeny.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a racial quota
in an affirmative action program that used race as a determin111
ing factor for admission to medical school. The petitioner,
Bakke, argued that he was not admitted to medical school because he identified as white, while other students were admit-

109. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also infra note 120.
110. The Supreme Court uses multiple factors in determining whether a
class is considered a suspect class. Some of these factors are: “whether the
class has suffered a history of purposeful discrimination; whether the class is
defined by a trait that bears no relationship to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society; whether the trait defining the class is immutable; and finally, whether the class is a discrete group subject to prejudicial majoritarian political power.” benShalom v. Marsh, 690 F. Supp. 774, 777 (E.D.
Wis. 1988).
111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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ted because they identified as a member of a minority ethnici112
ty. Under the admissions program in question, the medical
school reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats for minority
113
students. Holding the particular quota-based admissions program unconstitutional in Bakke, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion stated, “the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
114
origin.” Thus, while a quota is not constitutional, the Bakke
Court held that non-quota affirmative action programs initiated to promote equality may be constitutional if properly de115
vised, surviving strict scrutiny analysis.
Under the strict scrutiny test established in Bakke, an affirmative action program must survive strict scrutiny review
when it involves “a government practice or statute which restricts fundamental rights or which contains suspect classifica116
tions.” An affirmative action practice or statute survives this
scrutiny analysis when it “furthers a compelling government
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is
117
available.” Courts must evaluate all suspect acts or statutes
118
on individual facts and circumstances. Additionally, in order
to justify the use of a suspect classification, “a State must show
that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible
and substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguard
119
of its interest.” This narrowly tailored requirement ensures
112. Id. at 277–78 (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 279; see also Title IV, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (1964) (authorizing
technical assistance to public schools attempting to desegregate).
114. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
115. See id.; see also Quota, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining quota as “[a] proportional share assigned to a person or group; an allotment” or “[a]n official limit on the number or amount of something that is allowed or required over a given period”).
116. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“[I]n dealing with
claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an
interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to
them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling
facts.” (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343–44 (1960))).
119. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973) (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment as an amendment created to counteract discrimination);
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the protection of a class in hopes of promoting equality and
120
avoiding the advancement of stereotypes.
Post-Bakke, the Court held race and other characteristics
grouping individuals together can be factors used in determining things like admission and employment promotions, but con121
The
tinued its opinion that quotas are unconstitutional.
Court specified, “[C]lassifications are not per se invalid under
122
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Even though the individuality
provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment may be affected, it
does not mean it is violated when affirmative action programs
123
are instituted. Critics of affirmative action jurisprudence argue that by allowing race classifications to be the focus of the
discussion, emphasis is often placed upon the possible benefits
received by “nonparty . . . minority beneficiaries of the program[]” rather than the harm experienced by the plaintiff who
124
brought the case. Consequently, this shifts the rights protected from individual rights to group rights, which is contrary to
125
what the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments provide.
Within the Bakke opinion the Court mentions that affirmative action programs created in an attempt to eliminate gender
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (illustrating the heavier burden required to justify classifying a group of people for legislation).
120. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). For further explanation of
avoiding the advancement of stereotypes, see the discussion of sex-based affirmative action programs in Part I.C.2.
121. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 355–56. In Bakke the Court decided characteristics could be factors. Not all characteristics receive the same level of scrutiny
review. For example, gender receives intermediate scrutiny, a less strict
standard—and one that is easier to justify using classifications as factors—
than the strict scrutiny required for race based classifications. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny for using gender as a factor, rather than the strict scrutiny required for using race as a factor).
122. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356.
123. See id.
124. John V. White, What Is Affirmative Action?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117,
2129 (2004); see also id. at 2127–31 (arguing affirmative action undercuts
American antidiscrimination law in a variety of ways, including changing the
standard of proof needed to show discriminatory practices exist and focusing
on the benefits received by nonparties over the harm received by the plaintiff );
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1161–62 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (concluding based on the
harm received by the plaintiff; unlike the reasoning issued by the Supreme
Court, the California Supreme Court found Bakke was not admitted because
of the admissions program, focusing on intent, injury, and causation).
125. See White, supra note 124, at 2131.
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126

disparities would not receive the same strict scrutiny. The
Court distinguishes sex-based classifications from race-based
classifications because, in the Court’s opinion, sex-based classifications would create fewer “analytical and practical problems”
127
than race or ethnic-based classifications. The Court says this
is because “racial . . . preferences present[] far more complex
and intractable problems than gender-based classifications.
More importantly, the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that
128
gender-based classifications do not share.” Precedent shows,
however, that facial quotas would still not survive even intermediate scrutiny, the lesser scrutiny standard applied to sex129
based affirmative action programs.
After Bakke the Court frequently faced the question of con130
stitutionality of many affirmative action programs. Just a
year later, in 1979, the Court held a private company’s program
reserving fifty percent of seats in the training program for African Americans was not a violation of constitutional rights, but
131
fit squarely within permissible behavior of Title VII. While
facially this may appear to be a quota, Justice Brennan distinguished this program because it “is a temporary measure; it is
not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to elimi132
nate a manifest racial imbalance.”
The Court embraced Justice Brennan’s statement attempting to cure the manifest imbalance, but not without limits. The
Court did not allow the continuation of a non-quota affirmative
126. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) (citing Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
127. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302–03. The Court said there are fewer practical
problems with “gender” based classifications because “there are only two possible classifications.” Id. Whether this is true or politically correct in today’s
society is outside the scope of this Note, but it is the Court’s justification in
Bakke.
128. Id. at 303.
129. E.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding
the state-supported professional nursing school could not categorically exclude
males from enrolling).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185–86 (1987) (affirming a narrowly tailored affirmative action program promoting wellqualified African Americans, partially because of their race); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny for a race affirmative action program); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny for a gender affirmative action program).
131. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 195, 197 (1979).
132. Id.
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action program that terminated white workers before their African American colleagues when downsizing, not considering
133
any aspect of their employment record other than race. Slight
preferential treatment in hiring and granting promotions does
not affect the individual on the same level as employment termination. The Court found termination of a person who identified as white over an African American did not help to elimi134
Thus, attempts to cure the
nate the racial imbalance.
manifest imbalance are encouraged and allowed, but in positive
ways such as hiring and promoting, but not in terminating employees because of race.
While the quota at issue in Bakke, and any quota, is unconstitutional, not all programs implemented to increase diversity are quotas. Affirmative action programs have constitutionally been instituted in attempts to address and redress
historical discrimination and mistreatment. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held constitutional a university program promoting diversity by attempting to increase the number of Afri135
can American students in its law school. The law school at
the University of Michigan used a race-conscious admission
program that included an applicant’s race as one of the factors
136
when it considered whether the applicant was qualified. The
affirmative action program did not use race as a dispositive factor, but the factor did carry significant weight in admission de137
cisions. The Court found that because it was just a factor and
not dispositive, the program was distinguishable from the quo138
ta deemed unconstitutional in Bakke. The Court emphasized
the university had a compelling interest in creating a diverse
139
student body. Although requiring a quota, a specific number
of seats to be filled strictly based on race, is still considered unconstitutional, the Grutter opinion stresses that programs similar to the program in Grutter have the possibility of surviving
the strict scrutiny analysis if they are narrowly tailored and

133. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 (1984).
134. See id. at 577, 579; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 282 (1986) (“Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals,
they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.”).
135. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
136. See id. at 309, 315–16.
137. Id. at 338.
138. Id. at 337 (emphasizing the importance of “this individualized consideration” as “paramount” to the distinction from Bakke).
139. Id. at 328.
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promote a compelling government interest by the least restric140
tive means.
The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to require strict
scrutiny for race-based affirmative action programs. While this
interpretation reaffirms the unconstitutionality of quotas, it
does not deem all race-based affirmative action programs unconstitutional. Affirmative action programs are not quotas, because affirmative action programs can be constitutional and
quotas cannot. Affirmative action programs consider an individual’s protected class characteristic and ensure that characteristic is used to benefit the individual instead of detriment
her, as it may have historically.
2. Sex Is a Classification Protected by Affirmative Action
Bakke and all aforementioned jurisprudence considered racial affirmative action programs and the strict-scrutiny requirements that these programs must survive to be deemed
constitutional. This jurisprudence is not limited to race-based
discrimination, however; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects
and encourages the continued support for many other histori141
cally disadvantaged groups. Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, Title VII allows for the promotion of persons
based on sex, if in a specified context a sex is historically disad142
vantaged. As the Court stated, “Sex-based statutes . . . must
be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of our Nation’s
143
‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’” Title VII
allows for constitutional affirmative action programs promoting
women, in an effort to reverse a long and ever-present history
144
of sex discrimination.
This Section contrasts the scrutiny requirements for race
and sex-based affirmative action programs, explains why sex is
considered a qualifying characteristic under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and reviews pertinent case law surrounding sex affirmative action programs.

140. Id. at 306, 326–28.
141. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (including “color, religion, sex,
or national origin”).
142. Id.
143. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 136 (1994)).
144. See id.
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a. Affirmative Action Programs for Sex Need Only Survive
Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis
Affirmative action programs promoting the advancement of
racial minorities receive a different level of scrutiny than affirmative action programs promoting the advancement of an
underrepresented sex. Bakke establishes that affirmative action programs addressing race must survive strict scrutiny.
These programs must be narrowly tailored, fulfilling a compelling government interest, and there cannot be a less-restrictive
145
alternative available. Unlike race, sex receives intermediate
scrutiny, making it easier to find constitutional affirmative ac146
tion programs created to bring equality among the sexes. If a
sex-based affirmative action program is narrowly tailored
enough to survive intermediate scrutiny, it does not violate the
147
Fourteenth Amendment. To survive an intermediate scrutiny
review for sex discrimination, the program supporters must
demonstrate (1) some past discrimination, either by the gov148
ernment or not, against a sex; and (2) the affirmative action
is one that was fact-based and analyzed, and not based on ste149
reotypes. Additionally, “[F]or a gender-based classification to
withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established ‘at
least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those ob150
jectives.’”
b. Women Are Considered a Suspect Class Because of a Long
History of Sex-Based Discrimination
To qualify as a proper affirmative action program, the program must be created to protect a group of people who fit with145. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny for a race affirmative action program), with Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny for a gender affirmative action program).
147. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
148. NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1580 (11th Cir. 1994).
149. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d
Cir. 1993) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 582–83 (1990)).
150. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60–61
(2001) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
533 (1996).
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151

in a protected classification. For example, when discussing a
race-based affirmative action program, observable in Bakke,
people who identify as white do not receive any sort of suspect
152
classification protections. The Court explained the absence of
suspect classification protections for people who identify as
white by stating, “the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
153
political process.”
While previous discussion focused on racial affirmative action and righting racial historical wrongs, affirmative action
programs to mitigate disparities between sexes have also been
154
deemed constitutional. Women, like racial minorities, have
been and continue to be discriminated against. As Hillary Clinton said, “I am a woman and, like millions of women, I know
there are still barriers and biases out there, often unconscious,
and I want . . . an America that respects and embraces the po155
tential of every last one of us.” In Frontiero v. Richardson, the
Court stated, “There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination . . . which, in
156
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”
Examples of discriminatory practices and beliefs based on sex
are abundant: one of our founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson,
expressed that women “should be neither seen nor heard in so157
ciety’s decision[-]making councils.”

151. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–91 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (plurality opinion).
152. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing how whites are not a historically disadvantaged group and do not deserve any suspect, protected classification under Title VII).
153. Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
154. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J.)
(plurality opinion) (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate the basic concept of our [legal] system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))).
155. HILLARY CLINTON: IN HER OWN WORDS 57 (Lisa Rogak ed., 2014) (citing Hillary Clinton’s concession speech on June 7, 2008).
156. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
157. Id. at 684, n.13.
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The “sexual contract” helps to explain how historically
women were placed in the caregiver role, an inferior role to
158
men. The sexual contract argues women were prevented from
holding any position that would allow them to make social or
political change, because only women could procreate and “protecting” women from the world of work would safeguard the
159
continuation of the human race. This historical disenfranchisement has followed women throughout the decades, result160
ing in fewer female faces in positions of power. The sexual
contract theory is reflected in early jurisprudence. In 1873, the
Court opined:
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of
161
women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.

Historically, women in the United States have been restricted in career choices because of socially assigned sex requirements and laws that have been created to enhance sex
162
normality stereotypes. For example, in the early 1900s a law
163
existed restricting the number of hours women could work. In
164
1908, the Supreme Court deemed this law constitutional.
Women were not to work as much as men, because they were
158. See Suk, supra note 3, at 1808 (describing men’s and women’s roles
through the sexual contract theory as a reason for the existence of gender stereotypes).
159. See id. at 1807–08 (explaining the sexual contract as a theory to make
certain the next generation would exist and be well cared for, the class of persons watching over them could not be focused on any other aspect of life).
160. See generally JESSICA BENNETT, FEMINIST FIGHT CLUB: AN OFFICE
SURVIVAL MANUAL FOR A SEXIST WORKPLACE 113 (2016) (“[F]or hundreds of
years, it’s been culturally ingrained in us that men lead and women nurture.
So when a woman turns around and exhibits ‘male’ traits—ambition, assertion, and sometimes even aggression—we somehow see her as too masculine,
not ladylike enough, and thus we like her less.”).
161. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–85 (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
162. See Suk, supra note 3, at 1808 (describing how women’s societal roles
are historically based on gender stereotypes).
163. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1908).
164. Id. at 423.
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women and that characteristic alone was enough to allow spe165
cialty legislation, limiting their workplace involvement. This
law reflects just what the sexual contract details: women must
not participate in social change or involvement, because they
166
are to procreate.
The Supreme Court held that using sex stereotypes constitutes a violation of equal protection under Title VII because it
167
prevents equal treatment in the workplace. Studies have
shown “women are viewed as having less leadership ability
than men, as less assertive than men, less willing to take risks
than men, less willing to take a stand than men, and less will168
ing to defend their beliefs than men.” Women are frequently
characterized as too kind, too sweet, and too gentle to hold posi169
tions of power. Any discriminatory practice based on stereotypes attributed to sex, be it termination of employment or lack
of consideration for promotion to a seat on an executive board,
170
violate protections provided for in Title VII. However, precedent allows promoting a woman to a position, using sex as a
factor, if the promotion is in a traditionally male-dominated
171
field.

165. Id. at 422–23.
166. See Suk, supra note 3, at 1807–08 (describing the sexual contract).
167. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“In forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978))), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2017) (superseded on other grounds,
regarding damages).
168. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 958 (1996) (emphasis added).
169. But see generally ADICHIE, supra note 8, at 18 (“Today . . . [t]he person
more qualified to lead is not the physically stronger person. It is the more intelligent, the more knowledgeable, the more creative, more innovative. And
there are no hormones for those attributes. A man is as likely as a woman to
be intelligent, innovative, creative.”); REBECCA SOLNIT, MEN EXPLAIN THINGS
TO ME 34 (2014) (“Kindness and gentleness never had a gender, and neither
did empathy.”).
170. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (holding one cannot use affirmative action to reinforce stereotypes).
171. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 636
(1987) (holding that you can promote a woman over an equally qualified man
because of gender in positions typically male-dominated).
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c. Constitutional Affirmative Action Programs Promoting
Women
Determining whether a sex-based affirmative action program is constitutional is a burden-shifting process. Initially it
is the adversely affected party’s burden to show a prima face
case that sex has been taken into account in making an em172
ployment decision. Once this has been established, an employer must meet its burden by asserting proof of an affirma173
tive action program. If proof is shown, the burden shifts back
to the employee to prove the employer’s justification is
174
pretextual and the program is invalid.
To be valid, the affirmative action program must survive
175
intermediate scrutiny. There must be some past discrimination against the advantaged sex, and the program must be fact176
based, not promoting stereotypes. The employer need not
show their particular business has historically discriminated
against a sex, but only needs to demonstrate imbalance in tra177
ditionally segregated jobs. To claim an imbalance reflecting
an underrepresentation of women an employer may compare
“percentage[s] of minorities or women in the employer’s work
force with the percentage in the area labor market . . . who pos178
sess the relevant qualifications.”
The Supreme Court has deemed an affirmative action program encouraging the promotion of women into a particular po179
sition of employment constitutional. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Transportation Agency set short-term goals
for itself to revisit annually to provide accurate and achievable
180
employment decisions. The short-term goal in dispute was
three women for the fifty-five expected openings in that partic181
ular position. The Court found this program “did not unnec-

172. See id. at 626 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–03 (1973)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d
Cir. 1993).
176. See id.
177. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
178. Id. at 632.
179. Id. at 641–42.
180. Id. at 636.
181. Id. (describing this goal as “modest . . . of about 6% for that category
[or position]”).
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essarily trammel male employees’ rights or create an absolute
182
bar to their advancement.” Additionally, even though there
were numerical goals, the Court found this program did not reduce to blind hiring, because it considered only qualified candi183
dates for the positions. This affirmative action program explicitly stated it was temporary; the Court discussed possible
hesitations it may have if a program was to “maintain” a work
184
force rather than “attain a balanced work force.” Thus, the
Court held that an affirmative action program promoting women over men because of sex was constitutional because it was a
short-term goal that did not unnecessarily trammel the rights
of or absolutely ban the advancement of men, and only consid185
ered qualified applicants.
One aspect consistently focused upon by the Court is that
sex-based affirmative action programs cannot advance stereo186
types. A clear example of this reasoning can be found in Mis187
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan. In this case, a male
applicant who was denied admission to the nursing program at
the Mississippi University for Women brought suit arguing a
188
Title VII violation. The Court deemed the women-only nurs189
ing program unconstitutional. The Court articulated the need
to look into the program’s purpose:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straight forward, it must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning roles and abilities of males and females . . . . Thus, if the
statutory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
190
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.

182. Id. at 617.
183. Id. at 637–38 (contrasting this program with others by stating that
even though there are numerical goals, numerical goals do not always constitute quotas); see, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 160, at 133 (providing an example
of how some companies already do this: the production company required a
blind application process for the newest Star Wars movie that required any
list of possible writers, directors, actors, and producers to be representative of
sex and race in the United States).
184. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639 (emphasis omitted).
185. Id. at 637–42.
186. See generally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 140 (2003)
(“Gender stereotypes . . . trap women by categorizing them in ways that don’t
reflect the true complexities of their lives.”).
187. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
188. Id. at 720–21.
189. Id. at 733.
190. Id. at 724–25.
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The relationship between the means and the program’s objective purpose are necessary to “assure that the validity of classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than
through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccu191
rate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”
The determined purpose for only allowing women was not one
promoting a disadvantaged group in the field, because women
were the dominant sex within that field of work. Thus, the
Court determined this program only perpetuated stereotypical
roles for men and women and violated Title VII of the Civil
192
Rights Act of 1964.
Affirmative action programs advancing the promotion of
women can be constitutional under Title VII. Sex-based affirmative action programs can be constitutional because women are
193
a protected class in certain circumstances. A sex-based affirmative action program must survive intermediate scrutiny to
194
be constitutional. Intermediate scrutiny is easier for affirmative action plans to survive than the strict scrutiny required of
race-based affirmative action programs, making it easier to
create and implement constitutional sex-based affirmative ac195
tion programs than race-based affirmative action programs.
D. STATISTICS OF GENDER REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
As this Note has demonstrated, other countries have seen
success in increasing female representation on corporate boards
by enacting quota legislation or voluntary programs to require
or incentivize companies to include more women in their highest level of leadership. The United States has neither legislation nor voluntary programs, and as this Section will explain,
the statistics for female representation on corporate boards
shows an increasing gap between the gender composition of the
United States and foreign corporate boards. This Section first
provides statistics for female representation on corporate
boards in the United States. It then compares these statistics
with the percentage of women on corporate boards in other na-

191. Id. at 725–26.
192. Id. at 733.
193. See supra Part I.C.2.
194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that gender discrimination is evaluated under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny).
195. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978).
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tions, specifically nations that have enacted programs to correct
corporate board sex disparities.
The population of the United States is just over fifty per196
cent female. Women earn nearly sixty percent of all under197
graduate and masters degrees. Women account for thirtyeight percent of masters in business and management degrees
and thirty-six percent of masters in business administration
198
degrees. Women compose just over forty-seven percent of the
199
workforce and hold nearly fifty-two percent of all professional
200
level jobs. At S&P 500 companies in 2014, women composed
201
forty-five percent of employees. Yet, women hardly hold four202
teen percent of executive board positions.
In 1995, white men composed forty-three percent of the
workforce, yet held ninety-seven percent of the top executive
positions at the 1500 largest corporations in the United
203
States. This leaves only three percent for anyone who does
not fall within the cross-section of identifying as male and
white. In 2015, the numbers differ slightly. Of S&P 500 companies, just over fourteen percent of executive board members are
204
female. Twenty-four women hold the highest executive board
position, chief executive officer, out of the 500 positions availa205
ble in S&P 500 companies. Twenty-four out of 500 means
206
roughly women hold five percent of CEO positions. Women
hold a larger percentage of seats on S&P 500 board of directors.
196. JUDITH WARNER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP
GAP: WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2015).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. FFF: Women’s History Month: March 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15
-ff05.html (citing in 2013, women composed 47.4% of the labor force in the
United States).
200. WARNER, supra note 196 (detailing women’s involvement in leadership positions in many areas of business and politics).
201. Id.
202. Egan, supra note 11. Looking at the Fortune 500 companies instead of
the S&P 500, statistics show women held 11.7% of board seats in 2000 and
held 16.9% in 2013. Id.
203. Oppenheimer, supra note 168, at 967 (citing AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 23 (1995)).
204. Egan, supra note 11.
205. Id.
206. Matt Egan & Sophia Ordonez, How Many Women Are in the C-Suite?,
CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/infographic/investing/female-ceo
-leadership/?iid=EL (last visited March 31, 2017) (providing a list of companies
with women as CEO).
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Based on proxy statements submitted by S&P 500 companies in
207
2015, women held 19.9% of the board seats. If leadership that
is representative of their workforce is what companies are
striving for, the United States has a long way to go.
In a global comparison of the percentage number of women
on corporate boards, the United States is tied with Australia
208
for tenth place. Norway, France, and the United Kingdom, all
countries with either a quota or a voluntary program, are
209
ranked higher than the United States.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, QUOTAS, AND THE
DISRUPTIVE PRESENCE OF INEQUALITY IN BOARD
ROOMS
For some, removing sex-based stereotypes in modern social
thought and promoting leadership that is representative of the
workforce may be the underlying goal of having more women
on executive boards. For others, more business-focused, the
primary goal may be to make business the most efficient, money-making machine it can be. Luckily for both groups, having
women on corporate executive boards is a means to reach both
ends. This Part displays the benefits companies have experienced after introducing women to their corporate boards. Then,
this Part reiterates how programs established by individual
employers to promote female representation on corporate
boards are constitutional. Lastly, this Part addresses counterarguments on the benefits of female involvement on corporate
boards and affirmative action generally.

207. 2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men Board Directors, CATALYST
(June 14, 2016), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2015-catalyst-census
-women-and-men-board-directors.
208. Ben Rooney, Best and Worst Countries for Women on Corporate
Boards, CNN MONEY (Jan. 13, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/13/news/
companies/women-corporate-board-global (using a Catalyst study’s data pool,
the United States has 19.2% female representation on corporate boards of directors).
209. Id.; see also WARNER, supra note 196, at 4 (“In private-sector women’s
leadership . . . the United States ranks number four in women’s economic participation and opportunity on the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Gender Gap
Index of 142 countries . . . [b]ut in the public sector . . . the United States lags
far behind many countries.”).
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A. WHY WOMEN? BENEFITS OF A GENDER DIVERSE EXECUTIVE
BOARD
While it may be easy to discredit an argument that stereo210
types all women to have the same characteristics, it is more
difficult to discredit statistics. In 2015, women only accounted
for approximately nineteen percent of corporate directors and
fourteen percent of corporate officers in S&P 500 companies in
211
the United States.
Reducing the sex disparity is not only good from a social or
cultural perspective. In the United States, “the ‘business case’
for diversity is the proposition that diversity in a firm . . . will
enhance the company’s bottom line, measured primarily by
212
shareholder value.” Many observable business benefits are
consequential to having more women present on the executive
board, such as corporate social responsibility, improved financial performance, and an increase of women in upper-level, non213
board, positions. Companies with both men and women on
their executive boards have statistically contributed more to
214
philanthropies and donated more money to charities. Over a
210. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 65 (2007)
(“[W]omen are criticized . . . for being timid or emotional . . . for harsh, overly
assertive conduct; for excessive zeal and loyalty to the company; and for unrelenting pursuit of perfectionism by their subordinates as well as themselves.”);
Egan, supra note 11 (stating that women are “very good at multitasking, have
a sixth sense with people, are nurturing and service-oriented” (quoting Maggie
Wilderotter, past CEO of Frontier Communications)); Horn, supra note 75
(providing examples of advice often given to women to succeed in maledominated professions, such as “push forward rather than shrinking back
while approaching childbearing years [and] be more assertive”).
211. See 2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men Board Directors, supra
note 18; Kimberly Gladman et al., Women on Boards in the Americas, CATALYST (May 31, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-boards
-americas (showing in 2013, women held sixteen percent of corporate board
positions); Rachel Soares et al., Fortune 500 Executive Officer Positions Held
by Women, CATALYST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/
fortune-500-executive-officer-positions-held-women (stating women held 14.6%
of executive officer positions in Fortune 500 companies in 2013).
212. Suk, supra note 3, at 1805; see also David B. Wilkins, From “Separate
Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of MarketBased Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004) (“If American business is to continue to expand and prosper in a competitive global economy . . . then [American corporations] must have access to a substantial pool of talented minorities. . . . Diversity . . . is not only ‘good for business,’ it is essential.”).
213. Weisul, supra note 18.
214. Soares et al., supra note 211.
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span of five years, companies with women on their corporate
executive boards outperformed companies with two or fewer
women on their board by eighty-four percent on returns on
sales, sixty percent on return on invested capital, and forty-six
215
percent on return on equity. Studies show that companies
that have corporate executive boards that include women in
their composition tend to have a smaller pay disparity between
216
men and women. Additionally, it has been reported, “With
more women on boards, a wider range of insight, perspectives,
and experiences are brought to bear on the issues a board fac217
es.” Companies on the S&P 500 with female members on
their board of directors are more likely to have equity-based
compensation for directors, representing the interests of share218
holders over those of individual directors. A study by Harvard
Business Review reported that if there was parity between the
sexes in the workplace, the United States economy would earn
approximately $4.3 trillion more between 2016 and 2025, and
$2.1 trillion more by 2025 if all companies in the United States
219
matched the company with the fastest progress to parity.
Not only does allowing women a seat at the executive
board table take a step in the right direction for antidiscriminatory employment and a more representative leadership body, it has been proven to produce impressive business
215. Nancy M. Carter & Harvey M. Wagner, The Bottom Line: Corporate
Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004–2008), CATALYST
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/bottom-line-corporate
-performance-and-womens-representation-boards-20042008.
216. Dammann, supra note 34, at 75 (showing women employed by companies with a woman CEO make ten to twenty percent more than women who
work in companies with a male CEO).
217. Weisul, supra note 18 (quoting Kris Byron, a professor at Syracuse
University who examined 140 studies of board performance across thirty-five
countries). Some may argue this statement is premised on stereotypes that
women carry different personality traits because of their gender. As previously
discussed, the Court has emphasized stereotyping is wrong; however, not because it is not ever correct, rather, because it is sometimes wrong. See generally Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (invalidating a divorce proceeding requiring support for a son until he was twenty-one to help pay for his
education, but only for a daughter until she was eighteen because a woman’s
role is not to continue her education, but to raise a family because stereotypically that is what women do).
218. Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and
Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 301–03
(2009).
219. Kweilin Ellingrud et al., How Reducing Gender Inequality Could Boost
U.S. GDP by $2.1 Trillion, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://hbr.org/
2016/04/how-reducing-gender-inequality-could-boost-u-s-gdp-by-2-1-trillion.
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benefits that possibly lead to fairer and more equal social poli220
cies. Thus, whether a corporation’s goal is to fight injustice
and underrepresentation or to be more productive and make
more money, adding women to its executive board is beneficial.
B. SEX-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUCCESSFUL IN INCREASING THE NUMBER
OF WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS
Despite the social and fiscal benefits to increasing female
representation on corporate boards, United States companies
have fallen behind foreign companies in achieving sex parity in
executive boardrooms. Although the United States cannot
adopt the gender quota requirements of other nations, sexbased affirmative action programs are an alternative, and constitutional, method to address this disparity. This Section reiterates the constitutionality of sex-based affirmative action programs. Then, it provides examples of domestic and
international companies that instituted an affirmative action
program and integrated more women into leadership positions.
As discussed in Part I, affirmative action programs insti221
tuted to combat sex discrimination are constitutional. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the program proponents must show
the program combats past discrimination and that it is fact222
based, rather than promoting gender stereotypes. Throughout
American jurisprudence, many sex-based affirmative action
223
programs have been upheld. Additionally, other effective sexbased affirmative action programs in the United States are not
reviewable in case law, because they have not been challenged
in a court of law.
At one point in time, sex-based affirmative action programs
were accountable for helping roughly six million women retain
224
and maintain employment. An example of a global business
220. See Suk, supra note 46, at 454–59 (discussing how gender quotas in
France demonstrate that such quotas can lead to greater democratic policies).
221. See supra Part I.B.2.
222. See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010
(3d Cir. 1993).
223. For an example provided and described in this Note see, Johnson v.
Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 636 (1987) (upholding a
gender based affirmative action program because it promoted women into a
field where their gender is underrepresented). But see Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (holding the affirmative action program
unconstitutional because it promoted gender stereotypes).
224. Sally Kohn, Affirmative Action Has Helped White Women More than
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that has been recognized for its successful sex-based affirma225
Worldwide, women compose
tive action program is IBM.
twenty-nine percent of IBM’s workforce and twenty-five percent
226
of their management. While this does not speak directly to
IBM’s executive board makeup, it does show that affirmative
action programs can help promote women into leadership positions. Once women are in important leadership positions, they
can help implement policies that render a work environment
more amenable to foster future female leaders. For example,
IBM hosts meetings with its female executives from across the
globe to formulate strategies that allow employees to realisti227
cally balance their work and lifestyle needs. Two of the concerns addressed were the lack of female mentorship/networking
and the difficulties surrounding childcare and the lack of flexi228
ble scheduling. These conversations lead IBM to implement
its Child Care Resource Referral System and a similar program
for elder care, among other tools “not provid[ing] an advantage,
but . . . eliminat[ing] the disadvantage” executive women
229
face.
Thus, not only are sex-based affirmative action programs
constitutional, they have been utilized to promote women leaders into positions of power. As can be observed in the successful
IBM program, once women leaders are in the influential positions of executive power, policies can be instituted to maintain
women leadership capabilities.
C. BENEFITS PROVIDED THROUGH GENDER-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS OUTWEIGH THE ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
Sex-based affirmative action, like any form of affirmative
action, does not come without its fair share of criticism and
Anyone: Their Successes Make the Case Not for Abandoning Affirmative Action, but for Continuing It, TIME (June 17, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/
06/17/affirmative-action-has-helped-white-women-more-than-anyone.
225. See generally Diversity & Inclusion, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/
employment/us/diverse (briefly highlighting the diversity and affirmative action mission of IBM).
226. Building an Equal Opportunity Workforce: Transforming the World,
IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/equalworkforce/
transform.
227. The Advancement of Women in IBM, WORLD BANK, http://www
.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pos00/pdfs/Women.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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concerns. This Section discusses a few of the criticisms surrounding affirmative action programs created to combat sexbased discrimination. While these criticisms do exist and may
have some merit, this Note argues that the benefits such constitutionally permitted programs provide far outweigh any of
the below-mentioned apprehensions.
An argument against the creation of affirmative action as a
stepping-stone for equality is that affirmative action encour230
ages separatism. The argument is that by focusing on the differentiating characteristic, such a program emphasizes that the
231
specified group of people are unable to succeed on their own.
A similar argument was used against the implementation of
race-based affirmative action programs under the Civil Rights
232
Act of 1964, for example in Title VI and Title VII. The purpose of these programs was to eliminate additional barriers facing groups of people who historically were discriminated
233
against; however, the worry that affirmative action programs
promote the separation of these groups still exists and is widely
234
debated. The view this Note supports—the view that the majority of the Supreme Court holds—is that affirmative action is
necessary and constitutional in combatting discrimination and
promoting those who are disadvantaged because of the history
235
of discriminatory practices.
One counterargument to this Note’s stance is that affirmative action programs for women in executive board positions
230. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978).
231. Id. at 298; see also United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173–74 (1977).
232. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (“[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth.”); Andrew F. Halaby & Stephen R. McCallister, An Analysis
of the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Racial “Stigma” As A Constitutional Concept in Affirmative Action Cases, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235 (1996) (highlighting
arguments that race-based affirmative action programs stigmatize the very
groups they intend to protect).
233. See Lee, supra note 27 (“[T]he original purpose of Affirmative Action
was to provide redress to [historically disadvantaged groups].”).
234. Tanner Colby, Affirmative Action Doesn’t Work. It Never Did. It’s Time
for a Solution, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/
history/features/2014/the_liberal_failure_on_race/affirmative_action_it_s_
time_for_liberals_to_admit_it_isn_t_working.html (“[T]he effect of affirmative
action overall was to funnel upwardly mobile blacks into a separate employment pipeline.”).
235. Grutter v. Bollinger, 549 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding an affirmative
action program at a university constitutional).
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lead to unnecessary initial costs to business. When Norway instituted a gender quota for women on executive boards, the initial business impact was negative: stock price at the introduction of the law decreased and did not immediately increase
236
While implementation
when the quota was implemented.
may have had initial monetary costs, Norwegian officials said
the benefits of this legislation far surpass its monetary ef237
fects. The Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion supports the law because, “[i]f women make up
more than half of university educated persons, but only seven
percent of corporate directors, this would suggest that corporate boards are missing out on a significant pool of Norway’s
238
talent.” Additionally, as discussed above, even though businesses may witness a brief drop in monetary gain, having an
executive board where both sexes are represented provides
239
long-term monetary benefits.
Critics also argue that sex-based quotas or affirmative action programs producing similar effects lead to unqualified or
240
under-qualified executive board members. This argument is
without merit. In order for an affirmative action program to be
constitutional, to determine underrepresentation, it can only
compare the seats available on the board to the number of qual241
ified women in the field. Thus, in the program’s creation and
application, it can only consider women who are qualified, alleviating this fear. Additionally, it would be a detriment to a
business’s interest to institute a program that would lead to incompetent executive representation. It would be in the best interest of the business that instituted the program to seek out
the best candidates for the job. Participating in an affirmative
action program may require a business to look beyond its normal applicant pool, but not necessarily outside of its internal
employees, and definitely not outside of the qualified applicants
in the field.

236. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards:
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127
Q.J. ECON. 137, 159–60 (2012).
237. Suk, supra note 46.
238. Id. at 452.
239. Carter & Wagner, supra note 215.
240. Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 236, at 145.
241. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616,
631–32 (1987).
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The last counterargument is what is known as the ‘opt-out’
argument. Some argue that women choose not to hold executive
board positions because they are simply too demanding and do
not align with the family-based focus women have; in other
242
words, women do not want to be executive board members.
Setting aside the stereotyping surrounding this discussion, it
would be inaccurate to argue that this argument is entirely untrue. Some women choose to stay at home with their children or
243
to move to a less demanding job because they want to. Not all
women on the management and executive track have this
mindset, however. To deny the promotion of sex-based affirmative action plans because “women do not want to be executives”
is promoting the sexual contract and the continuation of sex244
based discriminatory employment practices. Companies, like
IBM, have taken and should continue to enact the necessary
policies that allow women to choose to “opt-out” but do not force
245
them out. If the reason women are not represented on executive boards is truly because they are opting out, then the data
will continue to reflect the numbers present today once affirmative action programs are implemented, nullifying this counterargument.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
ALTERNATIVE TO QUOTAS, PRODUCING A SIMILAR
OUTCOME IN COMBATING INEQUALITY
For any change in the composition of executive boards to
occur, Americans must recognize women are underrepresented.
Then, society must believe this underrepresentation is problematic. Once people of the United States recognize the problem, then our society will be open to a solution. While this may
sound rudimentary, it is critical to note that discussion of gender quotas sprouted internationally after public discussions articulated disgust at the fact that women are underrepresented
in leadership roles in the business world, especially on corpo-

242. See Judith Warner, The Opt-Out Generation Wants Back in, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/magazine/the-opt
-out-generation-wants-back-in.html.
243. Id.
244. See Suk, supra note 3, at 1807–08 (detailing the social contract and
historical discriminatory practices to keep women in the caretaker role).
245. See Building an Equal Opportunity Workforce: Transforming the
World, supra note 226.

2017]

DISPARITIES ON CORPORATE BOARDS

2129

246

rate boards. Recent topics of public concern in the United
States include conversations surrounding equal pay for men
and women, but there is not the same debate surrounding the
247
lack of female representation in top leadership positions. If
we look strictly to the international models, it is apparent that
without an initial public discussion, change will not occur in
the United States.
Anti-quota and anti-affirmative action discussion remains
unaltered today from what it was in its initial application;
whether the discussion revolves around race or sex, some people are wary that unqualified people will be promoted simply
248
because of a physical characteristic. There is an uncomfortable dichotomy: “No one wants to be seen as the token female
who only got a role because of a quota, but there’s also
249
acknowledgement that the pace of change is too slow.” Something has to change to help establish equal representation, but

246. See generally Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 36 (showing conservative and liberal perspectives in conversation surrounding the creation of
gender quotas in France); Totten, supra note 33, at 29–44 (showcasing conversation surrounding the European directive for gender quotas and gender
equality in Europe); Rachel A. Van Cleave, Luogo E Spazio, Place and Space:
Gender Quotas and Democracy in Italy, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 329 (2013) (highlighting the necessity of promoting women in Italy before the national creation
of gender quotas).
247. Nolan Feeney, Jennifer Lawrence on Pay-Gap Essay Backlash: ‘Thank
You For Proving My Point,’ TIME (Nov. 25, 2015), http://time.com/4126967/
jennifer-lawrence-pay-gap-essay-backlash (describing the backlash actress
Jennifer Lawrence received after pointing out to the press how unfair it is that
women do not get paid the same amount in the entertainment business and
how they tend to not ask for more money when negotiating contracts).
248. Compare Affirmative Action: Joint Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
99th Cong. 337 (1985) (statement of Julius LeVonne Chambers, DirectorCounsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund) (“[A]ffirmative action
does not mean admitting or hiring unqualified or less meritorious candidates.”), with Horn, supra note 75 (“The principle of equal protection under the
law . . . has a lot going for it, and quotas, even when set internally, are one hell
of a mess where equal protection is concerned. Though the aim is to correct an
injustice, and the assumption is that the highly qualified women who have
previously been passed over will now get the jobs they, by merit, deserve,
that’s not necessarily the way it plays out.”).
249. Egan, supra note 11; see also CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S
SON 74–75 (2007) (“[A]ffirmative action (though it wasn’t yet called that) had
become a fact of life at American colleges and universities, and before long I
realized that those blacks who benefited from it were being judged by a double
standard. As much as it stung to be told that I’d done well in the seminary despite my race, it was far worse to feel that I was now at Yale because of it.”).
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anti-affirmative action fears remain ever-present in colloquial
conversation around possible solutions. It is estimated that “at
the current rate of change, it will take until 2085 for women to
reach a parity with men in key leadership roles in the United
250
States.” In 2085 it will be the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s 121st
birthday, which is far too long to wait to see parity of the sexes
in business leadership roles.
This Part introduces a two-step solution to combating the
inequality of sex representation on corporate executive boards.
Section A showcases the first step in the program, a voluntary
program promoting transparency and social responsibility, similar to the program established in the United Kingdom. Section
B describes the second part of the plan, building on the voluntary program by adding an incentive to set an inclusionary target and establishing necessary mentoring programs. If properly
structured and enforced by private businesses, such a program
allowing and encouraging promotion of qualified women to executive boards would not only be constitutional, but essential to
combat inequality and promote accurate representation of the
sexes.
A. ESTABLISHING A VOLUNTARY PROGRAM PROMOTING
TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Encouraging corporations to be transparent about the
composition of their executive boards and upper management
positions could lead to corporations becoming socially responsible by way of more female representation on boards and in upper management. This effect is observable by the changes in
corporate board make up after the release of the Zero List in
251
2014. The number of corporations with zero women on their
board of directors shifted from fifty corporations in 2014 to
252
eighteen in 2015.
If the United States makes corporate board composition
transparency voluntarily, it is unlikely all companies will comply in a timely fashion, especially companies that currently
have an entirely male executive board. It would be worthwhile
250. WARNER, supra note 196, at 5 (detailing women’s involvement in leadership positions in many areas of business and politics).
251. See Weisul, supra note 18.
252. Id. Nothing states that releasing the Zero List is the only reason or
direct cause of the increase in female representation on corporate boards.
However, nothing has been released to show the Zero List had no impact on
the subsequent outcome.
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to have the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) periodic reports produced even more publically than
253
they are now. The data encompassed in the EEOC’s reports is
critical to showing trends in female employment in public industry and would be a valuable tool in increasing transparen254
cy. Non-profit organizations, like Catalyst, could also assist in
255
the mass distribution of this information.
A voluntary program, similar to what is promoted by the
30 Percent Club in the United Kingdom, may have a chance for
256
success in the United States. In fact, the 30 Percent Club has
257
a chapter in the United States. Currently, there are sixty-six
board members and CEOs in the United States that are mem258
bers of the 30 Percent Club. The goal established by the 30
Percent Club is to have women constitute thirty percent of executive board directors on S&P 100 boards by the end of
259
2020. A few companies currently partnered with the United
Kingdom voluntary program are: Berkshire Hathaway, Cisco,
260
Citigroup, Deloitte LLP, Kate Spade, and Coca Cola. This
branch of the 30 Percent Club has established a mentorship
261
program and coordinates events to promote its mission.
To bolster the effects of the voluntary affirmative action
program, the EEOC should release two consistent, widely pub-

253. See Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry (EEO1), U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo1/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2017)
(providing reports for the minority and female trends in employment status in
private industry).
254. If it is shown, especially in the first few years of pushing an equal representation initiative in private industry, that more research is necessary than
what is currently being provided by the EEOC, Congress can always commission additional research to be conducted and presented by the Congressional
Research Service. See About CRS, LIB. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/
about (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
255. For an overview of the Catalyst organization, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
256. What We Do, 30 PERCENT CLUB, https://30percentclub.org/about/what
-we-do (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (describing initiatives to increase women’s
involvement in business).
257. See About, 30 PERCENT CLUB, https://us.30percentclub.org/about (last
visited Mar. 31, 2017) (detailing the programs available in the United States).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Cross Company Mentoring Program, 30 PERCENT CLUB, https://us
.30percentclub.org/initiative/cross-company-mentoring-program (last visited
Mar. 31, 2017).
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licized lists of organizations: one list of companies participating
in the program and their progress toward sex parity, and another list of companies who are not participating and have
262
made no progress. The concept of these reports is very similar
to the Zero List: to promote social responsibility. In the modern
era, social responsibility is becoming more and more important
263
and driving business practices. It is argued that “[t]hese days
corporate motivation seems almost beside the point because of
the significant business risks to ignoring [corporate social responsibility]. Consumers and other companies are likely to
264
shun firms that develop unethical reputations.” Taking affirmative steps in creating a program to help combat discrimination based on sex and correct the underrepresentation on executive boards must be observed as a socially responsible
business practice. Socially responsible business practices are
“business objectives [that] need to be to both maximize shareholder value in the long term and to address society’s biggest
265
problems.”
Even with the creation of and progress made by the zero
list and the 30 Percent Club chapter in the United States, the
movement’s success thus far has not been statistically observable. The 30 Percent Club’s United States chapter claims that
the percentage of women on executive boards has increased
from 20.2% to 23.2% since the chapter’s launch in 2014 in busi266
nesses on the S&P 100. Women in the United States still hold
267
only five percent of chief executive officer positions. It is diffi262. This research would continue to be conducted and released by the
EEOC but would be promoted and published more through the participating
companies and the EEOC.
263. Social responsibility is “[t]he obligation of an organization’s management towards the welfare and interests of the society in which it operates.”
Social Responsibility, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/
definition/social-responsibility.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
264. Why Companies Can No Longer Afford To Ignore Their Social Responsibilities, TIME (May 28, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/05/28/why
-companies-can-no-longer-afford-to-ignore-their-social-responsibilities. Social
responsibility is also proven to be one of the driving forces in engaging and retaining talented workforce: “70% of young Millennials . . . say a company’s
commitment to the community has an influence on their decision to work
there.” Id.
265. Id. (quoting Wharton professor Jerry Wind).
266. About, supra note 257 (noting that the executive board make-up of the
companies that have members in the 30 Percent Club have seen greater success, with female representation up to 28% from 21.9% in 2014).
267. WARNER, supra note 196 (detailing women’s involvement in leadership positions in many areas of business and politics).
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cult to definitively state that this sort of voluntary program
would be as successful in the United States as it has been in
268
the United Kingdom. We have, however, seen some progress.
The Zero List has increased the number of women on executive
269
boards in a short time frame. The increase in representation
is small, but with increased publicity and consistent annual reporting, an entirely voluntary program fueled by social responsibility may be all the United States needs.
B. TAX INCENTIVE ADDITION TO BOLSTER THE EXPANSION OF
THE VOLUNTARY PROGRAM
Although an entirely voluntary program could still have a
large impact on the sex make up of United States corporate
boards, a voluntary program combined with a government incentive for participation is the ideal solution to address the sex
disparity on United States corporate boards. To avoid any confrontation with government regulation of the composition of executive boards, the United States should institute a voluntary,
opt-in program where companies establish their own target
goals and, if their goals are met, are rewarded with a tax incentive. A voluntary program established by private businesses
will fit within a constitutional, affirmative action landscape.
While the Norwegian program of strict quotas and severe
punishments may be an example of a system worth striving for,
such implementation stretches what is remotely fathomable
within the norms and laws of the United States. Similar to
what Germany established in Germany’s first step toward gender quotas for smaller, publicly traded companies, the target
number of female board members would be set on an individu270
al, company-by-company basis. By establishing the program
specifics on their own, companies would ensure the affirmative
action programs were made factually specific to that individual
271
company, ensuring the programs constitutionality. The goal’s
268. See SUSAN VINNICOMBE ET AL., CANFIELD INT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN
LEADERS, THE FEMALE FTSE BOARD REPORT: 2015: PUTTING THE UK PROGRESS INTO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 19 (2015) (describing the European Union’s new requirement of corporate transparency, a non-financial reporting directive, to promote diverse management and leadership in European
countries).
269. See Weisul, supra note 18.
270. See Teigen, supra note 36, at 131 (describing the target program established in Germany).
271. See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010
(3d Cir. 1993) (providing the requirements of a gender-based affirmative ac-
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timeframe would be pre-established to make certain that progress is made in a reasonable time; and, because the program
would be temporally limited, it would allow for companies to set
goal numbers of women on the individual company’s executive
272
board. If a program is temporally limited, having a goal of a
specific number of women on a company’s executive board
273
would likely be constitutional. While this reasonable standard may seem arbitrary, the percentage would be one established by the company itself, so it would be defined as whatever
that company deemed reasonable at that time for its business.
In addition to setting a target goal for the number of women holding corporate board positions, companies who opt into
this program will need to create additional programming to ensure continued success. Placing women at the top will not automatically ensure the number of women in leadership will increase at a faster rate than what is observable now, but
establishing a pipeline of women in leadership roles would be a
274
helpful step to speed up the process. Establishing a pipeline
will lead to both mentorship and sponsorship critical to the ad275
vancement of women in leadership. Creating a mentorship
program of women in high leadership roles with women currently working farther down the ladder and women in graduate
or undergraduate school with business aspirations would be a
condition companies would be encouraged to set in their individually tailored affirmative action plans.
If the companies chose to opt into this voluntary program
and they achieved their goal within the required timeframe,
tion program to be constitutional and survive intermediate scrutiny when
based on specific analysis).
272. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cty, 480 U.S. 616, 638–
40 (1987) (holding a program with short-term goal numbers is constitutional,
as long as it is to attain and not maintain and is temporary).
273. See id.
274. See Egan, supra note 11 (“If you don’t have women in the pipeline,
they are not going to get the top job . . . . It doesn’t just mean being a mentor.
Sponsorship means you are really fighting for that person.” (quoting Rita
McGrath, professor at Columbia Business School)).
275. See id.; BATES, supra note 2, at 236 (describing a study that showed
not only that men are more likely to be hired and paid more than an equally
qualified woman, but that the companies were more likely to offer the male
applicants career mentoring than they were the female applicants); Egan, supra note 11; see also Building an Equal Opportunity Workforce: Transforming
the World, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/
equalworkforce/transform (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (describing IBM’s programming that was instituted to promote the continued success of women
leaders and executives).
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then they would be rewarded. First, the EEOC would release to
the public which companies successfully reached their targets.
Just as described in Section A, the socially responsible business
276
practices would bring the company valuable benefits. This
would create public conversation and encourage continued socially responsible growth.
Companies would also receive a tax benefit if they successfully met their goal of female representation on their executive
boards. Congress would create a tax benefit initiative that
would provide a tax break for the companies that reached their
goal. The scope of Congress’s ability to tax and spend is expan277
sive and some tax initiatives approved by Congress, like this
benefit would be, are explicitly for the purpose of promoting so278
cial welfare. Thus, a tax incentive would be provided to companies that successfully reach their short-term goal within the
allotted timeframe. This tax benefit would be proportionate to
the company’s annual tax payment as determined reasonable
279
by Congress. The tax incentives would be reevaluated annually and would increase as representation moved towards equilibrium within the corporate board. For example, a company
that met their short-term goal of ten percent female representation would receive a tax benefit, but would receive a smaller
tax benefit than a company of the same size that reached their
goal of twenty-five percent female representation.

276. See supra Part III.A.
277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”);
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (explaining Congress’s spending power is not limited just to directly granted powers to spend provided for
in the Constitution).
278. See Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for
Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 47 (2014) (providing examples like alternative fuels, solar power, clean energy, and electric
cars).
279. Another solution to explore that is beyond the purview of this Note is
if states were to institute statewide gender affirmative action programs in
public companies, then Congress could provide the state with additional funds.
Congress has the power to attach conditions when granting federal funding to
the States. To allow for conditions to be placed upon the states, spending must
be (1) in pursuit of the “general Welfare”; (2) “unambiguous[ ] . . . enabling the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation”; and (3) related to federal interest in “national projects or
programs.” See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
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If any person challenged the legality of a company’s affirmative action program, it would be reviewed individually by
a court of law. This would be necessary to ensure an accurate,
fact based review to maintain the program’s constitutionality
under the intermediate scrutiny test and to avoid the continuation of gender stereotyping. This Note does not encourage the
creation of a regulatory, administrative agency review of these
individualized affirmative action programs. However, under
this Note’s proposed solution, such agencies would emphasize
the benefits a company would receive if it reached out to the
EEOC or other administrative body for guidance when creating
and implementing its affirmative action programs to ensure
their constitutionality.
While the tax incentive may encourage companies’ involvement in the voluntary program, the social discussion
emerging in response to the executive board compensation reports would be enough to spark the necessary conversation of
underrepresentation. The United States would finally be able
to join the conversation that is taking place internationally, as
observed in Norway, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. As socially responsible business practices continue to have
a positive effect on businesses, the United States will remain
competitive, while counteracting a long and ever-present history of discriminatory practices based on sex.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, women are vastly underrepresented
on corporate executive boards. Antiquated sex-based stereotypes deeming women incapable of leadership, stemming back
to the 1800s when women’s only societal role was to reproduce,
are ever-present; however, the problem is fixable. The United
States should look internationally to nations establishing gender quotas on executive boards for examples of the importance
of gender equality and for the tools necessary to work toward
gender parity. The conversation surrounding the legislative
history in creating quotas in Norway, France, and Germany is
helpful, even though creating quotas may be unconstitutional
in the United States. This same international insight can be
used to form a similar, but constitutional, alternative to redress
historically discriminatory practices: affirmative action, which
can be narrowly tailored to increase the number of women on
executive boards.
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Instead of establishing an improbable and unconstitutional
quota, the United States should introduce a two-step program
utilizing Congress’s spending power, allowing private companies to opt into a voluntary program encouraging equality
among the sexes and receiving a benefit for doing so. First, the
United States should encourage companies to borrow from the
United Kingdom a voluntary program promoting and encouraging the socially responsible business practice of equal representation on executive boards. Then, a tax benefit would be granted to companies successfully reaching their goals in
incorporating women into their boards, expanding involvement
in the voluntary program. The affirmative action-based legislation suggested in this Note will not introduce change as quickly
as required by quotas in Norway or Germany, but will bring attention to a problem often ignored. Filling seats at the executive board table with women will not only bring the United
States into the equality conversation being held by many other
developed nations, but will also promote business success in the
global market through the benefits received from a genderdiverse corporate board.

